Standard publicly declared that they considered the agreement to have lapsed, owing to France's wartime status as an enemy power during the period of the Vichy regime. 6 During an autumn visit to Europe, representatives of the American oil majors further bolstered the US position by maintaining that the Sherman Antitrust Act forbade them to respect the restrictive provisions of the agreement, which would amount to cartelization. 7 The secret deals between Americans and British convinced the French that they ought to reinforce their information-gathering activities on foreign oil agreements. At a CFP board meeting in December 1946, Director René de Montaigu confirmed press rumors that Jersey and New York Standards had acquired shares in ARAMCO, while President Victor de Metz informed the board of a new agreement between Anglo-Iranian and the two Standards. 8 
The deal reassured British and US governments about controlling oil provisions in the Middle
East at the expense of French energy security. During the next twenty years the British government-controlled AIOC sold Jersey 160 million tons (Mt) of crude, and the two companies jointly built a pipeline linking the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean. 9 The British used it for their Kuwaiti crude, which they exploited on a fifty-fifty basis with Gulf (another US firm). Shell's neutrality was also acquired through a very favorable contract allowing the company free access to Kuwaiti oil: from May 1947, Gulf provided 30 percent of Shell's crude oil requirements in the Eastern Hemisphere. 10 Naturally, the CFP managers understood that American and British governments had done nothing to prevent this situation (in fact they had encouraged it), but it was especially the extension of British and US oil interests in Northern Africa that the French could not However at the last minute Kilian withdraw his support and the secrets of Fezzan's underground would remain hidden for some time.
Kilian had also urged the French government to prospect Algeria for hydrocarbons.
His observations on the sediments of the Hoggar area, in the Sahara, suggested the existence of geological conditions apt to the presence of oil. In November 1948 his report was passed on to the French Académie des Sciences, sealed in a box, and stayed untouched until the geologist's death three years later. 14 Kilian's hypotheses on the area turned out to be only partially accurate, but his work paved the way to the exploration of the Sahara desert, and instigated the CFP to prospect more. 15 The dispute between British and French governments on Fezzan continued and, by the end of the 1940s, it was informed by other factors. The Soviets sought to support Arab nationalism in the region, partly in an effort to gain control of oil resources. US and British oil companies now stealthily mobilized their own scientific monitoring networks to search for new oilfields out of Soviet and French reach. To this effect the British even employed a geologist turned diplomat and military intelligence agent:
Francis James Rennell Rodd. A specialist in the study of oil-bearing structures of the Fezzan region and a collaborator to the International Geological Map of Africa, Rodd exploited his knowledge of local territories and local elites in an attempt to gain control of its yet untapped oil deposits. In March the French Ambassador received a reply from George Marshall, the US Acting Secretary of State, so the legal challenge at least helped the French to force the Americans to compromise. By the end of May 1947 a settlement was reached. The CFP would withdraw its objections in exchange for an increase in its share of IPC production which would also be increased considerably its 7 Cantoni and Veneer, Oil Security output to accommodate French oil demand. 20 The Heads of Agreement were signed by all the major IPC partners a year later. 21 British and Americans diplomats thus realized that the French government was prepared to make use of its experts, intelligence agents and lawyers in defense of oil security, or in order to force them to renegotiate existing agreements to increase French oil supplies in the wake of the Cold War. However, more security concerns soon arose in Paris and soon forced the French to reconsider their position in the Middle East consortium with a plan to invest more in North African resources.
The scramble for oil in North Africa
The new IPC deal appeared to be short-lived. The superpowers' influence in the Middle East Léon Kaplan of Shell were also close to Guillaumat and directly involved in French oil exploration. 22 The French began to explore North Africa by using all techniques made available by CGG, especially through a grand gravimetry reconnaissance campaign in 1948, and through seismology from 1951. However, gravimetry was slow and its interpretation in the region proved hard; reflection seismology produced deceptive results, while photo-geology could not be applied outside the Saharan Atlas Mountains, where the mass of Mesozoic layers hindered surface geology. Because of these problems, the chief geologist of BRP's Algerian affiliate SN REPAL, Igor Ortynski, suggested that CGG apply seismic refraction; a method that had been out of fashion for decades, but which seemed to be more suitable to the geological characteristics of the Sahara desert. 23 From 1952 CGG started a new campaign that produced more successful results. Besides eliminating the problem of multiple reflections, refraction seismology allowed penetrating younger geological layers and forming a picture of deeper layers. 24 The accumulation of this knowledge on local underground resources helped the French to focus on specific areas to explore. Those in the French Union -as the area formerly included in the French Empire was called from 1946 -could now be used without previous negotiations or the establishment of new consortia. 25 The Union was French territory and could therefore be treated as private ground. In the Algerian Sahara the BRP sponsored novel explorations through SN REPAL and with the collaboration of CFP. French experts thus gained a refined understanding of the geology of the Saharan region, which would soon prove of capital importance in the oil discoveries that took place between 1952 and 1954.
US and British oil concerns also developed an interest in Algerian oil and tried to get their shares of territory to explore. Guillaumat soon realized that Kilian's early findings and recently acquired geophysical knowledge should not be divulged, but this was not enough to grant safe and quick oil supplies from Algeria. The French needed to prospect more if they wanted energy autonomy within a few years. They were therefore faced with two main options: let the Anglo-American enterprises into the Sahara, and gain in efficiency, financial backing and technological knowledge; or continue their path independently at the risk of having to carry a colossal prospecting burden over many years. This second choice would be a dangerous scheme for a country heavily struggling with inflation. In June 1947, the French Director of General Affairs, Pierre Maisonneuve, organized a conference at the Under-Directorate of Algeria to discuss the prospecting plans of three foreign companies (Caltex, Gulf and AIOC) that had shown an interest in Algeria. 26 Several ministries and oil company representatives (including that of SN REPAL) attended. Guillaumat argued that collaboration with foreign companies would be extremely profitable to the French economy, due to the shaky state of French finances. 27 But his proposal to develop joint participations with these companies encountered resistance. The representative of the Algerian Government General, Henri Urbani, challenged Guillaumat's favorable attitude towards foreign companies, expressing his serious concern over a too permissive stance. The notable difference of viewpoints between Urbani and Guillaumat was also discussed at SN REPAL's board meetings, where it was concluded that foreign assistance was needed only in the supply of materials and specialized drilling staff. SN REPAL took the lead in general operations, and only collaborated with foreign enterprises in associations where it held a majority of shares. 
British and American attempts to enter Algeria
The surveillance of potential oil-bearing areas in Algeria was a decisive element in establishing whether or not the oil majors would try to enter Algeria and whether the French could stop them. Guillaumat knew that during World War Two the US Air Force had taken aerial photographs in Algeria and that the photos contained details of geological structures that revealed the presence of oil deposits. After the war, the French government had agreed with US diplomats that photographic material ought not to be shared without prior French 12 Cantoni and Veneer, Oil Security consent. On the other hand the French did not hold copies of these photographs either. 32 In 1947 French officials authorized Jersey Standard experts to see the photographs and the following year an agreement signed at the French Embassy in Washington enabled the French Air Force's Chiefs of Staff to obtain copies of the photos. It is likely that SN REPAL obtained access to these copies as well. 33 Caltex, Gulf, Anglo-Iranian and Shell had been attracted by the French exploratory activities in Algerian territories. Should oil be found, these companies were ready to wield the power they enjoyed as a result of the war in major exploratory campaigns. Yet, as they did not have access to the photos, they could not know enough about the real Algerian potential. So before setting foot in Algeria, they used their lawyers to sound out French reactions, and to determine from these reactions if the French had found oil deposits. In September 1947, one of Gulf's lawyers sent a letter to Yves Chataigneau, Governor General of Algeria, through the French Embassy in Washington. Gulf was ready to carry out prospecting works for over $1 million, including surface geological and seismic works, and photogeology. 35 We have seen that while Guillaumat saw favorably the collaboration with foreign interests, he wanted to retain absolute control of geological data. But Gulf demanded instead a series of guarantees, including the availability to Gulf of documentation kept by the Mine Service, SN REPAL, the Hydrography Service, as far as geology and oil exploration was concerned. Thus a conflict between different departments in the French government ensued and when Gulf applied for an exploration license, it was refused. 36 
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The same strenuous opposition, however, did not characterize SN REPAL's board, which welcomed a collaborative project with an affiliate of the US oil firm Jersey. In 1947 Jersey had shown some interest for searching oil in Algeria and had obtained authorization to send a team of geologists and carry out a study on the oil potential of the Saharan region, provided an account of the team's activities was transmitted to SN REPAL. Jersey could even use the set of aerial photographs taken during the war by the US Air Force for its exploration.
But the collaboration was short-lived. When the Americans realized (perhaps mistakenly) that the only area deemed to have serious commercial oil possibilities was one that would be assigned to SN REPAL, they pulled out. In 1954 the first of these companies discovered the first gas field of commercial value in the area, and two years later also discovered the Edjeleh oilfield.
Thanks to the geophysical knowledge put compiled during the past ten years, the French administration could thus address its energy security needs. SN REPAL and BRP discovered in 1956 the two largest Algerian oil and gas fields, Hassi Messaoud and Hassi R'Mel, and kept control of them. Since the main American concern regarding the conflict was to keep the Soviets out of North Africa, the early Cold War tensions on oil supplies between American and British oil companies and the France administration relaxed somewhat.
However, this situation was complicated by events in the late 1950s, principally the conflict for Algerian independence. While this paper does not discuss the impact of this conflict on French energy security in detail, it is worth mentioning that it partly upset the system of selective collaborations with foreign concerns that Guillaumat had put in place. In particular, both Italian and US firms now used the conflict as a lever to gain more influence in the exploitation of Algerian hydrocarbons. Meanwhile the French and the British joined forces in the Suez Canal crisis, thus overcoming their traditional enmity in oil affairs. This leads us to consider another case, that of the North Sea, where the gathering of knowledge on oil and gas fields was decisive in shaping relations between another former imperial power, Britain, and its neighboring countries.
The Race for the North Sea
The British case presents various points of contrast and comparison with the French, especially following the discovery of gas in the North Sea in 1959 (with the concomitant realization of the long-held expectation that there would also be oil). Up until then the British had not only -as we have seen -been active in North Africa and the Middle East, but had also been attempting to mobilize their allies to counter threats to oil security as much as
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Cantoni and Veneer, Oil Security possible. In particular, the oil disputes in the Middle East and North Africa between key Cold War allies highlighted to the British government the urgency of reaching agreements on oil security through supra-national organizations emanating from Cold War divisions. For instance, from the early 1950s Britain encouraged the defense alliance it belonged to, NATO, to take oil stockpiling seriously for both military and energy security purposes and mustered support for a Petroleum Planning Committee to look at the supply lines and storage of military and civilian oil across the alliance. The Committee was even made responsible for developing strategies to protect these supplies in the event of World War Three.
Another element producing anxiety in the British government was the diplomatic victory of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser in the Suez Crisis. This was bad for British oil security, but even worse for the French colonial interests, as, so the French claimed, Nasser was acting as a proxy between the Soviets and the Algerians, and was the main channel through which the North Africans received weapons supplies. The outcome of the Suez expedition strengthened the Algerian liberation movement, and made Nasser the champion of Arab nationalism. This outcome warned British policy-makers about existing threats to oil security and this continued to be a key issue in the administration of governmental affairs. Britain could now found itself isolated in its quest to secure more oil.
Similarly to the French administrators at the BRP, their British colleagues at the Ministry of
Power understood that the solution to the oil supply problem rested with the ability to know more about oil deposits underground. But in contrast with the French, the British found that the solution to their problems was much closer to home and required no intervention in colonies or former colonies.
So although underlying security concerns in Britain were similar to those of the French, the diplomatic and scientific pressures were different, and so were the strategies and fuel policies that the Ministry of Power adopted in response, the most important aspect of which, with regard to the North Sea, was to put together the essential information regarding gas fields so as to quickly establish control on its output through licensing. This was even more of an imperative as Britain had no state oil company, and was therefore reliant on commercial enterprise. The British government held a controlling stake in AIOC, but the company had been greatly changed by the Iranian government's decision to nationalize the Iranian oil industry in 1951, which had led to the Abadan Crisis. AIOC became the British Petroleum Company (BP) in 1954. 42 Before the discovery of gas in the North Sea, the British Government encouraged companies such as BP, Shell and Esso to stockpile crude oil and diversify their sources of supply as much as possible. 43 Nationalization never became part of the Ministry's strategy. The UK gas industry had been nationalized in 1948, but no state oil company was founded in Britain, even in the wake of the North Sea discoveries, for fear it would damage existing relations with the oil companies. 44 Nor were these arguments ever simply about business methods and oil revenues: in the international Cold War context, there was the ever-looming possibility that Soviet military action might affect both civilian and military oil supplies from the Middle East, and the great risk inherent in British dependence on imported oil became starkly clear as domestic demand continued to rise.
In the early 1960s, therefore, the British Government felt the potential threat to its supplies was serious, and quickly put into action a policy that not merely encouraged but actively forced rapid exploitation of North Sea oil through commercial and scientific avenues. Although oil and gas had been found just before WW2, from 1959 the location of the Slochteren gas field in the Groningen province produced a rush towards prospecting and finding more hydrocarbons. 45 
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The UK Parliament soon passed a bill claiming sovereignty over all submarine resources on its continental shelf and in 1962 British Petroleum (BP) established the first offshore prospecting site in Weymouth Bay. However, BP experts knew that sites in British waters had limited prospect, whereas the North Sea basin which geologically resembled northern Netherlands had much more promise. 46 Once the surveys (geological sampling, gravity and seismic) revealed that the richest field where placed in the Norwegian shelf, the British government sought to prevent other European countries from staking a claim on these fields by quickly reaching an agreement with Norway and licensing exploitation soon afterwards (see figure 2. 3).
[Figure 2.3. approximately here]
The agreement, signed in 1964, was far more advantageous to the Norwegians than they had expected, but would enable oil companies supplying Britain to gain permits to pump gas out quickly and virtually unchallenged, offering "oil security" for the foreseeable future.
The agreement with Norway over the division of all waters too far north for continental European countries to claim them was rapidly reached. Republic to enable BP's German subsidiary to gain access to the German North Sea. BP was excluded from a consortium that was to operate in this area because, the company was told, their interest had not been expressed soon enough. BP officials were reluctantly prepared to accept the decision. Yet they eventually learnt that the French BRP was admitted after BP was refused, and that BRP had expressed interest later BP had. Ministry of Power officials thus suggested to the Foreign Office that if BP was discriminated against, there might be reciprocity when it came to the issuing of licenses for British areas of the North Sea. In the end, BP became resigned to the situation when the Germans promised that the consortium would operate only in the German North Sea, and whole areas of German continental shelf in the Baltic remained open for other companies, BP included. Office officials that believed the Swedish government was forming a consortium of Swedish companies to explore its own waters. Though the Swedes would have to buy in equipment and expertise, the British government -and BP -thought that the formation of the consortium indicated the probability the probability that foreign companies would not be permitted direct access. 50 What worried them even more was that the Soviets might be luring the Swede somehow and be given access instead. Though the earlier case had not, in the end, resulted in either French or German companies being treated differently by the Minister of Power when he allocated licenses for the North Sea, the question was raised again for the Swedish case. Since British companies had not an urgent need to gain access to the Swedish continental shelf, British diplomats eventually agreed that there was no reason to openly challenge the decision. It seemed better to "adopt a liberal attitude ourselves and then take what credit we can for it rather than threaten reciprocal restrictions," as one Ministry official put it. been gathering more accurate geological data for two years, and all of them would continue to do so for another three. In contrast Ministry officials now realized that they would not be able to make sound evaluations on the reissuing of those licenses in the next round unless they possessed the same information.
organization it compelled the companies that had licenses to share their raw data with, in this case the Ministry of Power, so that information could be made readily available to its officials and ensured them overall control over licensing. Now, however, the lack of scientific expertise amongst Ministry of Power to process the raw data created anxiety since the licensed oil firms would share the data but not their scientific interpretations. The Ministry of Power therefore turned to the newly established Institute of Geological Sciences (IGS, formerly the British Geological Survey) and its new director, Kingsley Charles Dunham. The new committee now gave the IGS the mandate to looking at the geological and geophysical data available. 
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In essence the key problem for Dunham was that North Sea operators were being deliberately sluggish in sending their data, and there was little that either the Ministry or the IGS could do about that, especially as the physical well core samples were large unwieldy items requiring careful handling and storage. However, the Ministry needed at least some 23 Cantoni and Veneer, Oil Security information, and as quickly as possible. Most of the commercial operators were keen to cooperate, at least in principle and up to a point, and the North Sea Operators' Committee recommended to its members that they cooperate with any approaches for data from the IGS. 62 On the one hand, they were legally obliged under the licenses to provide at least their raw data, and since the Ministry issued the licenses, they could not afford to appear uncooperative. On the other hand, some of the operators knew that the Ministry of Power, following the IGS advice, would use their data to further broader national interests rather than that of oil firms. At the time it was even suggested that a National Hydrocarbon Corporation should be established to address the problem; but the proposal was rejected. 63 Dunham however now skillfully used the power and knowledge that being part of the Brundrett committee had given him. Firstly, he sought to re-orient the existing geology programs so as to bring to the fore oil security matters. His predecessor at the Overseas Geological Survey had already outlined a geological survey of the British Continental Shelf. This in fact later had the potential to cause problems between the Ministry and the operators. But they realized that the Minister might use their confidential data, or that independently collected by the IGS, to decide in favor of licenses issued to British Gas, though there was no nationalized oil interest. In this the Ministry was un-moveable, merely reiterating to the operators that its first concern was British national interests, which included British nationalized companies, though in practice it seems there was never any real conflict. Dunham has also to face the consequence of a White
Paper that advocated a different allocation of funds to NERC and IGS thus putting in jeopardy both the Continental Shelf Survey and the IGS Mineral Intelligence program. 67 So by the late 1960s Britain's oil security appeared under threat mainly because, in contrast with other Western European allies, Britain could not count on a nationalized oil company or insufficient investments in geophysical research. In case of conflict or due to sudden lack of supply, it was unclear if these companies would protect national or commercial interests. The threat deriving from establishing an independent national survey unit -however-convinced private oil firms operating in the North Sea to be more collaborative thus aligning to the only imperative of the British government, i.e. secure a constant supply of oil to Britain.
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By 1971 a number of major fields had been discovered by oil companies in the North Sea, and the rate of commercial exploration and discovery was rapidly increasing. A 110-mile marine pipeline was being planned from the Forties field to the coast near Peterhead, and Dunham reported that "official statements suggest that by the end of the decade a substantial proportion of the United Kingdom's oil requirements may be available from the North Sea," adding that this was "the most important geology-based development in Britain since the opening up of the coal-fields." Britain's concerns with oil supply had greatly reduced (notwithstanding the oil crisis of 1973).
Conclusions
In both Cold War Britain and France oil supply was at the center of national security strategies during the Cold War, due to the critical role of oil in the military-industrial complex and ever-increasing domestic demand. Guided by similar fortunes, namely discovering sources of energy in their national territories and colonies that granted a certain degree of self-sufficiency, and finding their interests in the Middle East threatened by increasing Soviet and American influence, the French and British governments attempted to secure control of oil reserves in Algeria and the North Sea respectively. While the French had relatively little difficulty in achieving quasi-exclusivity over Algerian exploration, a territory over which France had complete political control, the British strategy was made more complicated by the nature of the area of exploration, bordered by a number of independent European countries with their own energy and security concerns.
In the late 1940s, French oil security was shattered both by ploys to evict CFP from 28
